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equity investments in publicly traded firms are positive but lower than those of comparable
private investments. Further, SWF investment targets suffer from declining return on assets
and sales growth over the following three years. Our results are robust to controls for
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discounts are associated with SWFs taking seats on boards of directors and with SWFs
under strict government control acquiring greater stakes, supporting the hypothesis that
political influence negatively affects firm value and performance. (JEL G32, G15, G38)
We thank Geert Bekaert (the editor) and two anonymous referees for their valuable feedback. We thank Kate Holland,
Laura Pellizzola, Valentina Milella, Armando Rungi, Giacomo Loss, and Timothée Waxin for research assistance with
this project. We also benefitted from comments offered by George Allayanis, Wolfgang Bessler, Cecilia Chen, Mihaljek
Dubravko, John Earle, Espen Eckbo, Oral Erdogan, Mara Faccio, Joseph Fan, Chitru Fernardo, Igor Filatotchev, Nuno
Fernandes, Edith Ginglinger,Andrea Goldstein, Peter Hahn, Cam Harvey, Ron Jarmin, Stefanie Kleimeier, Kai Li, Donato
Masciandaro, Anthony May, Meijun Qian, Vikas Raman, Vanessa Rossi, Andrew Rozanov, Karl Sauvant, Koen Schoors,
Myron Slovin, Paola Subacchi, Georges Sudarskis, Marie Sushka, Vahap Uysal, Paul Wachtel, and Pradeep Yadav. The
current version of this study has benefitted from comments offered by participants in the 2013 ECCE-USM Financial
Globalization and Sustainable Finance conference at the Stellenbosch Business School, Cape Town, SouthAfrica (keynote
speech), the Sovereign Investment Lab’s workshop on Sovereign Wealth Funds, Long-Term Investment, and Growth:
Unlocking Potential (Venice; June 2013), and the Université Paris Dauphine (June 2013). We also appreciate suggestions
offered on a predecessor version of this paper by participants in the Fulbright Tocqueville Distinguished Chair lecture
(Université Paris-Dauphine; March 2008), the Comparative Analysis of Enterprise Data 2008 conference (Budapest),
the 2008 Financial Management Association European meeting (Prague), the 2008 Barbarians at the Gate conference at
Cass Business School (London), the University of British Columbia 2008 Summer Corporate Finance conference, the
Chatham House International Economics Research Workshop (London; December 2008), the 2008 Australasian Finance
and Banking Conference (Sydney), the 2009 Conference of theAutorité des Marches Financiers ScientificAdvisory Board
(Paris), the 8th Annual Darden International Finance Conference (Singapore; May 2009), the 15th Dubrovnik Economic
Conference (June 2009), the 2009 European FinanceAssociation meeting (Bergen), the Post-Crisis Era and the Expanding
Role of the State conference at the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (Seoul; November 2009) and
seminar participants at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, the University of Maastricht, the Ludwig-Maximilians-
Universität München, the University of Southern Mississippi, HEC-Montreal (Quebec), the University of Oklahoma, the
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM, Milan), Saudi Aramco, and King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals.
This work was supported by the Fulbright Commission, the Center for Financial Studies at the University of Oklahoma’s
Price College of Business, the Sovereign Investment Lab at Università Bocconi, the University at Buffalo, and the Saudi
Aramco Chair in Finance, King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, Dhahran, SaudiArabia. Send correspondence
to William L. Megginson, Price College of Business, The University of Oklahoma, 307 West Brooks, 205AAdams Hall,
Noman, OK 73019-4005; telephone: (405) 325-2058. E-mail: wmegginson@ou.edu.
© The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies.
All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.
doi:10.1093/rfs/hhv036
 RFS Advance Access published July 29, 2015
 at U
niversita Com
m
erciale Luigi Bocconi on Septem
ber 2, 2015
http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
[10:20 13/7/2015 RFS-hhv036.tex] Page: 2 1–43
The Review of Financial Studies / v 0 n 0 2015
The past fifteen years have seen a resurgence of government ownership
of firms. In contrast to the old model of state-led entrepreneurship, in
which the state owned and ran companies by ministerial diktat, today the
most important government stock buyers tend to act primarily or solely
as investors. Megginson and Fotak (2014) report that over the 2001–2012
period governments acquired more assets through stock purchases ($1.52
trillion) than they sold through share issue privatizations and direct sales
($1.48 trillion), testifying both to the growing role of governments in the
economy, despite multiple worldwide privatization waves, and to the changing
nature of government involvement. Among state-owned investors, sovereign
wealth funds (SWFs) play an especially prominent role, with investable assets
estimated at over $4 trillion and growing faster than any other institutional
investor group. The rapid rise of SWFs begs a question: can state-sponsored
funds, such as SWFs, ever act as objective, commercially driven long-term
global investors, managing their nation’s wealth as investment fiduciaries of
their citizens? Our paper addresses this issue by studying the impact of SWF
investment on firm value.
By some measures, SWFs have already been extensively researched. Yet
extant empirical research offers incomplete evidence about the impact of
SWF investments on the value of publicly traded companies. Studies that
examine SWF investments using event-study techniques (Dewenter, Han,
and Malatesta 2010; Kotter and Lel 2011) find positive announcement-period
returns. Unfortunately, these results offer little insight into the role of SWFs
as investors, as corporate finance research consistently documents positive
announcement-period abnormal returns for all types of direct stock purchases
by institutional investors.1 In addition, the debate on the impact of SWFs on firm
value is far from settled: Knill, Lee, and Mauck (2012) find evidence of SWFs
not providing the same monitoring benefits as other institutional investors. To
determine how the identity of the investing SWF impacts target firm value, we
develop and test hypotheses comparing SWF stock purchases to those made
by private financial investors and then explain the differential impact, while
accounting for differences in target selection and investment characteristics.
On the one hand, SWFs have the capability and incentives to monitor
portfolio firm managers and increase firm value by engaging actively in
the governance of target companies. While other institutional investors at
times play a similar monitoring role, the lack of explicit liabilities, the
long-term investment horizon, the low need for short-term liquidity, and the
capability of SWFs to acquire large stakes represent qualitative differences
1 Mikkelson and Ruback (1985), Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1987, 1990), and Hertzel and Smith (1992)
find positive stock price reactions to corporate purchases of another company’s equity securities, and Hertzel et al.
(2002) and Wruck and Wu (2009) similarly find that public firms that place equity privately experience positive
announcement effects. Also, a large literature finds positive target stock price reactions to share acquisitions by
hedge funds (Brav et al. 2008; Klein and Zur 2009) and other institutional investors, due either to anticipated
monitoring or in anticipation of an acquisition (Greenwood and Schoar 2009).
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with respect to private financial investors, which could be reflected in higher
relative valuations of investment targets. However, there also may be a
negative side to SWFs’investments, since sponsoring governments may impose
noncommercial, political objectives, not fully consistent with the shareholder
wealth maximization typically pursued by private firms. Alternatively, political
concerns about state investor meddling may induce SWFs to refrain from
taking an active corporate governance role in target companies, especially
when investing abroad. SWFs might thus tend to be passive investors who,
at best, do not contribute to the effective monitoring of target firm managers
and, at worst, help to entrench underperforming management teams. As a
consequence, investments by SWFs might create less value for target firms than
do comparable investments by private-sector investors, who are not affected
by political objectives and can exercise unconstrained ownership and control
rights.
We test these contrasting predictions using a manually constructed dataset
of 1,018 investments by SWFs (or by SWF-owned investment subsidiaries) in
publicly traded firms, over the 1980–2012 period, and a “benchmark” control
sample of 5,975 stock purchases by private financial investors. We document
strong, robust evidence of a statistically and economically significant “SWF
discount” wherein SWF stock purchases have a smaller valuation impact
on target firms than do comparable stock purchases by private investors.
Announcements of SWF investments are associated with a positive mean
abnormal return of 0.84%, compared with the 4.82% mean abnormal return
generated by the private benchmark investors. We restrict the benchmark
sample to the same acquirer and target countries, as well as to the same
time frame, yet SWF acquisitions differ significantly from those by private
financial investors: SWFs tend to target larger (higher total assets) and more
profitable (higher return on assets) firms, but tend to buy smaller stakes
and acquire control less frequently. Accordingly, we decompose this total
discount into three components, due to, respectively, target characteristics,
deal characteristics, and, most importantly, the fact that the investor is a SWF.
We find that differences in target characteristics account for a large portion
(approximately four-fifths) of this discount. Yet, even after controlling for these
target and deal differences, the estimated “SWF discount” is statistically and
economically significant, with a mean of −1.31%. Conservative back-of-the-
envelope estimation translates that into an average discount on firm market
capitalization in excess of $60 million for each SWF (rather than for each
private-sector) investment in a publicly traded firm, or an aggregate discount
of $60 billion in the sample we study.
While this discount is not consistent with the prediction that SWFs are
better corporate monitors than are private sector investors, a weaker market
reaction is consistent with the hypotheses of political interference and of
excessive passivity, both of which predict lower firm valuation, but by different
channels. We thus examine the determinants of this discount using regression
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analysis, with the aim of discriminating between these alternative hypotheses.
To mitigate the influence of SWF investment policies on coefficient estimates,
we first employ propensity-score weighting of coefficient estimates and second
limit our analysis to a sample of matched transactions. The analysis indicates
that the discount is greater when larger and controlling stakes are acquired
by highly politicized SWFs and, conversely, is smaller in the case of funds
enjoying a higher degree of independence from the sponsoring government,
most notably the Norwegian government pension fund-global (GPFG). Finally,
the acquisition by a SWF of a seat on a target firm’s board has a negative value
impact, especially when combined with larger stakes acquired.
The long-term operating performance of targets shows significant deterio-
ration following SWF investments relative to private investments, consistent
with the short-term relative value impact. Difference-in-differences analysis
reveals a decline in return on assets, sales growth, and market-to-book ratios
over time horizons spanning up to three years after the SWF investment.
Finally, regression analysis of operating performance confirms that larger stakes
acquired by funds subject to political interference are associated with lower
future profitability and growth.
We directly contribute to the literature studying SWFs. First, we assemble
a unique dataset of SWF investments that is larger in size and scope—and
more recently updated—than those used in extant studies, shedding light on a
notoriously opaque market. Second, we are the first to systematically compare
the value impact of SWF investments on targets to a suitable control sample of
investments by private financial acquirers, while accounting for the nonrandom
nature of the SWF target selection process.2 Importantly, our methodological
improvements lead to findings that are in sharp contrast with conclusions by
Kotter and Lel (2011) that the “the magnitude of the market reaction is similar
to the announcement effects of investments by institutional investors on stock
returns for a comparable event window,” as we provide robust evidence that
the cumulative abnormal returns of SWF investments are instead significantly
lower than those of comparable private-sector investors. In a similar fashion, our
results cast doubts on the conclusion by Dewenter, Han, and Malatesta (2010)
and Fernandes (2014) that SWFs behave, on average, as active investors. While
our analytical framework is very different, our results support the findings by
Knill, Lee, and Mauck (2012), who find that, over the five years following
SWF investments, target firms experience both lower stock price returns and
lower stock price volatility but that the decline in risk is not sufficient to
2 Extant studies (Kotter and Lel 2011 in the second part of their analysis; Knill, Lee, and Mauck 2012; Fernandes
2014) compare the long-term performance of SWF investment targets with that of matched firms. These studies
each identify a benchmark set of firms, while we focus on a benchmark set of transactions and on the subsequent
performance of targeted firms. This is a meaningful distinction. First, having a benchmark set of investments
allows for the comparison of announcement-period returns. Second, we maintain that the appropriate comparison
group for firms subject to SWF investments is a set of firms with similar characteristics subject to similar
private-sector investments, rather than a set of firms with similar characteristics not targeted in any discernable
investment.
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compensate for the lower returns; they conclude by noting that their results
are inconsistent with SWFs providing the same monitoring benefits as other
institutional investors. We further add to the literature on the impact of SWFs
by showing that the market reaction to SWF investments is not uniform. The
discount we observe is largely due to SWFs whose governance structures
do not provide an effective shield against political interference, which has
important implications both for the governments hosting SWFs and for the
intense regulatory debate surrounding SWF investments.
Our research also adds to the literature on institutional ownership, by offering
compelling evidence that the identity of an institutional investor has an impact
on firm valuation. In this sense, we add to the research by Chen, Harford, and Li
(2007), Brav et al. (2008), Klein and Zur (2009), and Ferreira and Matos (2008),
by providing additional evidence of the fact that not all institutional ownership
is value increasing and that not all institutional investors are good monitors.
Finally, in a broader sense, our analysis makes a methodological contribution
as well, as this study is the first, to our knowledge, to decompose the valuation
effect of a corporate event, as proxied by the short-term stock price reaction.
1. Hypotheses and Testable Predictions
The hypotheses discussed below relate to the differential impact of SWF
investments on firm governance and, ultimately, on firm behavior, relative
to private-sector investments. In our empirical analysis, we do not directly
observe firm governance; rather, we note that the extant literature finds firm
governance to be related to firm value (proxied by abnormal returns at
the time of SWF investment), profitability (return on assets), growth (sales
growth), and valuation ratios (market-to-book ratio).Accordingly, we formulate
our hypotheses and testable implications as they relate to firm value and
operating performance (profitability, growth, and valuation multiples). Table 1
summarizes these hypotheses and predictions.
Because of their long investment horizon, large assets under management,
and lack of explicit liabilities, SWFs may typify the patient, long-term
shareholders with the power and incentives to monitor portfolio-firm managers,
discipline underperformers, and sustain firm value creation in the long run
idealized in the corporate governance literature (Shleifer and Vishny 1986;
Edmans 2009; Cai, Garner, and Walking 2009; Chen, Harford, and Li 2007;
Klein and Zur 2009). Their investments should therefore create more value in
target firms than in those by comparable private-sector investors who typically
have short-run liquidity needs and explicit (often quite large) liabilities to
service. This hypothesis is consistent with the interpretation by Dewenter, Han,
and Malatesta (2010) and Fernandes (2014) of the impact of SWFs’activism on
firm value. The testable predictions of the “superior monitor hypothesis” (SMH)
are (1) SWF investments in a target firm’s stock should increase firm value and
improve operating performance more than private-sector investments, (2) this
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relative impact of SWFs on firm value and performance should be related to
the extent of SWF involvement, as measured by the size of the stake acquired,
acquisition of majority control, and appointment of directors on target firm
boards, (3) SWFs should be able to influence domestic firms more effectively
that foreign firms, so this relative impact should be greater for domestic firms,
and (4) as the marginal benefit of additional monitoring is likely lower for firms
with other significant blockholders, the relative impact of SWF investments
should be smaller in such target firms.
On the other hand, existing theory and empirical evidence suggests that
politicians are “bad owners” of corporations as they typically impose political
objectives that negatively affect shareholders’value (Shleifer and Vishny 1994;
Megginson and Netter 2001; Estrin et al. 2009). Being ultimately owned
and controlled by governments, the same logic applies when SWFs become
shareholders in target firms. More specifically, SWFs may not be seeking only
the highest possible financial returns, but may be used instead by home-country
governments to exert political influence in target firms. Accordingly, a negative
impact of SWF investments on target firm performance could result from the
imposition of a political agenda by SWFs diverting portfolio firm resources
to the benefit of SWF-sponsor countries or their rent-seeking politicians.
The relationship between Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala and General Electric (GE)
exemplifies the potential for distortions in firm behavior. In 2009, Mubadala
announced ownership of stake in GE equivalent to about 0.6% of shares
outstanding and the intention to acquire a larger stake and to become one
of the ten largest shareholders. In 2010, a venture (Mubadala GE Capital)
was established, with partnership and equal capital commitments by Mubadala
and GE. The partnership was described at the time as “a cornerstone of Abu
Dhabi’s drive to develop its local financial sector and give training to citizens
looking at careers in the field. It is also a crucial part of a broader effort
to wean the emirate’s economy off oil.”3 While the actual performance of
the partnership was never fully transparent, a recent analysis by the ratings
agency Moody’s states that the joint venture is a “weak intrinsic franchise with
limited origination capabilities” and has “modest profitability, which limits
internal capital generation.”4 More than a commercial venture for GE, this
joint venture appears to have been quid pro quo for capital injection, prioritizing
the development goals of the Abu Dhabi government over the interests of the
GE shareholders. But political actions can be, at times, less subtle. After the
collapse of its majority-owned Spanish conglomerate, Grupo Torras, the Kuwait
Investment Office was accused of syphoning $300 million from the group’s
reserves to make political payments in support of the war effort during the first
3
“Mubadala GE Capital eyes bond sales, expansion,” Gulf News, October 28, 2013.
4 For Moody’s full report, see www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-assigns-Baa2-issuer-ratings-to-Mubadala-
GECapital- Ltd–PR_310677?WT.mc_id=AM∼WWFob29fRmluYW5jZTQyX1NCX1JhdGluZyBOZXdzX0F
sbF9Fbmc%3D∼20141 023_PR_310677.
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Gulf War, mainly in the form of public relations expenses aimed at shifting
public opinion.5 As no such political interference is associated with private-
sector investments, this could lead to a weaker market reaction and lower
long-term operating performance for targets of SWF investments. Hence, the
“political agenda hypothesis” (PAH) predicts that (1) SWF investments should
lead to lower firm value and performance relative to private-sector investments,
(2) as the ability to impose political goals is related to the degree of influence
the SWF has on the investment target, larger stakes acquired, the acquisition of
majority control, and the appointment of directors on target firm boards should
lead to relatively lower firm value and performance, (3) companies operating
beyond the sovereign authority or government regulatory power should be less
exposed to political interference, and thus foreign SWF investments should be
associated with relatively higher firm value and performance, (4) the presence
of blockholders in a target should mitigate the influence of politically motivated
SWFs in target firms and lead to relatively higher firm value and performance,
and (5) political interference should have a stronger impact on investments
by “political” funds than for independent, professionally managed funds and
hence political funds should be associated with relatively lower firm value and
performance.
As noted above, the sovereign nature of SWFs leads to suspicion by
market participants, especially if the SWF is owned by a foreign government.
SWFs might thus refrain from taking an active corporate governance role in
target companies in order to not generate political opposition or regulatory
backlash. Extant evidence indicates that SWFs play only a small visible role in
target firm corporate governance and rarely take seats on target firm boards
(Mehropouya, Huang, and Barnett 2009; Rose 2008).6 In addition, the
monitoring role of SWFs might be further reduced by their reluctance to divest,
as selling large blocks of shares could also trigger political reactions and
resentment amongst local management, regulators, and market participants.
Accordingly, SWFs’ investments might be expected to become captive capital,
making SWFs unlikely even to exercise this type of governance upon threat of
exit discussed by Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003) and Admati and Pfleiderer
(2009) or to withhold their votes as a sign of displeasure with current managers
(Del Guercio, Seery, and Woitdke 2008; Edmans 2009). According to this
hypothesis, SWFs will tend to be very passive investors who, at best, do not
contribute to effectively monitoring target firm managers and, at worst, can
help entrench underperforming managers. As a consequence, investments by
SWFs will create less value for target firms than will comparable investments
by private-sector investors who will instead exercise unconstrained ownership
5
“Missing Millions – Kuwait’s Bad Bet – A Special Report.; Big Wallets and Little Supervision,” New York Times,
September 28, 1993.
6 We should note that not all commentators agree. For example, Dewenter, Han, and Malatesta (2010) interpret
their results as indicating an active governance role for SWFs.
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and control rights. The testable predictions of the “passive investor hypothesis”
(PIH) are (1) SWF investments should lead to lower firm value and performance
relative to private-sector investments, (2) a tendency toward a passive stance
would be reinforced by a lack of influence on target firms and hence lower stakes
acquired, the lack of control, and the absence of directors on the corporate board
should lead to relatively lower firm value,7 (3) given the higher risk of hostile
reactions, SWFs are more likely to assume a passive stance when investing in
foreign firms, so foreign SWF investments should be associated with relatively
lower firm value and performance, (4) since other blockholders could provide
monitoring benefits even when SWFs are not doing so, the presence of other
significant blockholders in target firms should lead to relatively higher firm
value and performance, and (5) due to enhanced political risk and hostile
reactions by other investors, SWFs from undemocratic or authoritarian regimes
should be more likely to assume a passive stance, leading to relatively lower
firm value and performance.
Given this set of conflicting predictions, the net impact of SWF investments
on firm value and operating performance can be only determined through
empirical examination. We emphasize that our main objective is to not
document the raw valuation impact of SWF investments per se but to
compare and contrast them to those resulting from similar, but private-sector,
investments. We employ standard event-study techniques, supplemented by
regression analysis, to achieve this and focus on measuring target firms’
abnormal stock-price reaction at the announcement of SWF investments and on
their long-term operating performance, suitably benchmarked against private
shareholders’ investments.
2. Data and Descriptive Analysis
2.1 Sovereign wealth fund definition and list
There is no consensus on exactly what constitutes a “sovereign wealth fund.”
This study employs the Sovereign Investment Lab’s (SIL) selection criteria,
presented in Miracky and Bortolotti (2009), which defines a SWF as (1) an
investment fund rather than an operating company, (2) being wholly owned
by a sovereign government, but organized separately from the central bank or
finance ministry to protect it from excessive political influence, (3) making
international and domestic investments in a variety of risky assets, (4) being
charged with seeking a commercial return, and (5) a wealth fund rather than
a pension fund, meaning that the fund is not financed with contributions from
pensioners and does not have a stream of liabilities committed to individual
7 Another proxy of passivity is large stakeholdings by shareholders without board seats, as a sign of willingness
to avoid control despite significant ownership rights. This variable will be used in the regression analysis.
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citizens.8 These criteria yield a sample of thirty-three sovereign wealth funds
from twenty-one countries. We find public equity investments with sufficient
data for nineteen of those funds, originating from fifteen countries, and the
resulting sample we employ is described in Table 2.9 Total assets for the funds
in our list are worth of $2.97 trillion, representing 71% of total asset under
management by SWFs documented by Megginson and Fotak (2014).
2.2 SWF deals and activism
The sample of SWF investments analyzed here originates from the SIL SWF
Database. The database covers domestic and international investments made
by SWFs, by SWF-majority-owned subsidiaries (including fully owned SWF
investment vehicles) between January 1980 and November 2012.10 The data
include investments in listed equity, unlisted equity, commercial real estate,
private equity funds, and joint ventures in which a SWF (or one of its majority-
owned subsidiaries) is an investor. The data are assembled using multiple public
sources. Information from five financial databases (Thomson One Banker,
Bloomberg, the Thomson Reuters SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database,
the Zephyr M&A database, and Zawya Limited) is integrated with data from
fund Web sites and from various news sources.11 From this dataset, we select
8 While this sounds clear-cut, ambiguities remain. Several funds headquartered in the United Arab Emirates are
defined as SWFs, even though these are organized at the emirati, rather than at the federal, level, because
the emirates are the true decision-making administrative units. The subnational UAE funds included are Abu
Dhabi Investment Authority, Investment Corporation of Dubai (and its subsidiary Istithmar World), Mubadala
Development Company, Dubai International Financial Center, International Petroleum Investment Corporation
(IPIC), and Ras Al Khaimah Investment Authority. We also include Norway’s GPFG since, despite its name, it
is financed through oil revenues rather than through contributions by pensioners and does not have any explicit
pension liabilities.
9 This table is based on a more comprehensive description of individual SWFs presented in Megginson and Fotak
(2014). For the complete list of SWFs meeting the SIL definition, see Bortolotti (2014). Many smaller SWFs are
both notoriously opaque in their investments and, at least partly due to their small size, less active. Our dataset
includes investments by 15 of the largest 17 SWFs (as ranked by assets under management).
10 We identify over 150 majority-owned (including fully owned) subsidiaries. In the remainder of the paper, any
reference to “SWF investments” includes investments by majority-owned subsidiaries, and any transactions by
“SWF acquirers” include transactions in which the acquirer is either a SWF or a SWF-majority-owned subsidiary.
As the main purpose of this study is to determine the impact of SWFs on investment targets, we include, in our
sample, all investments executed under the control of SWFs. In identifying such investments, we use a controlling
stake (equity ownership exceeding 50%) in the acquiror as a proxy for SWF control and decision making. Yet,
we note that investment vehicles that are majority, but not fully, SWF owned are rare in our sample, and the
overwhelming majority of subsidiary investments in the sample originate from fully owned subsidiaries. In
unreported analysis, we include only investments by fully owned subsidiaries and note that results are largely
unaffected.
11 The sources include the Lexis-Nexis database and the archives of Financial Times, New York Times, Wall Street
Journal, GulfNews, the Associated Press, Reuters, and others. We employ an additional methodology to collect
investments made by Norway’s GPFG. Since this fund almost exclusively accumulates small stakes through
open market purchases, its investments are rarely documented in the press and are almost never recorded
by commercially-available databases. GPFG does, however, post annual listing of all its equity holdings, and
investments in U.S.-listed stocks made by Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM), the asset management
arm of the GPFG, are publicly disclosed on a quarterly basis beginning in the fourth quarter of 2006. Using this,
we generate a list of new NBIM investments in U.S.-listed companies by tracking the annual investment lists
and determining when NBIM makes an initial investment, which we define as an investment that did not appear
in the previous year’s listing. We then follow NBIM’s holdings after the initial investment and record increases
10
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a subset of investments by SWFs (or their majority-owned subsidiaries) in
publicly traded firms. We limit the analysis to publicly traded firms as we
require firm-level data (both accounting and stock price information). Our final
sample contains 1,018 investments by SWFs (or majority-owned subsidiaries)
in publicly traded targets, for a total value of $352.1 billion. To our knowledge,
our sample is not only the most recently updated one but is also the largest
transaction-based sample employed in any study of the valuation impact of
SWFs.12 For comparison, Dewenter, Han, and Malatesta (2010) assemble
a sample of 996 transactions spanning 1997 to 2008, but those include
transactions not classified as investments (such as transfers between SWF
subsidiaries and asset purchases) and some transactions that are disaggregated
into multiple trades (for example, if a SWF acquires partial stakes in the same
target through different subsidiaries, which we count as a single observation).
The set of observations used in their empirical analysis is restricted to 227
investments and 45 divestments, in contrast with our largest event-study sample
of 799 transactions. Kotter and Lel (2011) study 503 SWF investments over
the period 1980 to 2009, of which 417 are employed in empirical analysis.
Knill, Lee, and Mauck (2012) employ in their analysis a sample of 231 SWF
investments.
Table 2 reports summary statistics about investments by individual SWFs.
Investment activity varies greatly across funds; average deal size ranges from a
tiny $16 million for Norway’s GPFG to $2.5 billion for China Investment
Corporation (CIC). Gulf state SWFs, such as Qatar Investment Authority
and International Petroleum Investment Corporation (IPIC), also display a
preference for very large investments, surpassing on average the $1 billion
mark. Not surprisingly, SWFs vary in average size of stakes acquired. The
strong preference for broad portfolio diversification by Norway’s GPFG is
reflected in the small stakes acquired (0.34% on average). On the other hand,
Abu Dhabi’s funds, such as Mubadala and IPIC, and Singapore’s Temasek tend
to buy the largest stakes, with averages ranging from 18% to 33%.
We further collect data on the total number of directors and individual board
member affiliations from a target company’s first annual report subsequent
to the SWF investment. Overall, SWFs seem quite reluctant to take board
seats, as they appoint directors in only 9.05% of investments in our sample;
this is significantly less frequent than director appointments observed for a
in their holdings as follow-on investments. We take the filing date—the day when NBIM files a Form 13F-HR
detailing its shareholdings in a listed firm—as the announcement date for event studies, since this is the date that
the stock ownership information is first disclosed. Given our reliance on Form 13F-HR as a data source, this data
is specific to investments in U.S. listed firms.
12 In contrast, a handful of studies employ larger datasets on SWF shareholdings at specific points in time, rather
than transactions. Fernandes (2014), Avendaño (2012), Avendaño and Santiso (2011), and Dyck and Morse
(2011) examine samples of SWF shareholdings in as many as 26,000 companies, all for holdings as of year-end
2008 or earlier. Lacking information on the investment transaction (including the announcement and completion
dates), these studies are unable to gauge the valuation impact of SWF investments in an event-study framework.
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comparable sample of private-sector investments (24.69%).13 Yet, we find great
variation in domestic versus foreign deals. While SWFs take seats in only 6.74%
of foreign investments (compared to 29.46% for benchmark private deals), they
do so in 30.30% of domestic investments (which is higher than the estimated
22.99% for benchmark domestic deals). Our estimates are significantly lower
than those by Dewenter, Han, and Malatesta (2010) for the overall sample
(6.74% versus their 15%) but our remarkably similar for domestic investments
(30.30% versus 28.2%).14 Interestingly, we do not find any directors appointed
by the Kuwait Investment Authority, Korea Investment Corporation, or Abu
Dhabi’s Mubadala (or their subsidiaries) to the boards of any target companies,
in spite of the large stakes often being acquired. The SWFs with the highest
propensity to acquire seats are IPIC and Oman’s State General Reserve Fund.
2.3 Classifying funds according to the degree of political independence
A defining characteristic of SWFs is their political nature, due to interference
by the sponsoring government, so we classify funds according to the degree
of political independence enjoyed by their managerial teams. Truman (2008)
offers, for each fund, a score (question eleven in Truman (2008): “Are decisions
on specific investments made by the managers?”) on a scale of zero to one, in
quarter-point increments, reflecting the level of independence of management
from governmental interference, with one indicating full independence.
Accordingly, we classify all funds with a managerial independence score of less
than one as “political funds” and all others as “nonpolitical funds,” and we create
a related binary variable (SWF political dummy) set equal to one for “political
funds” and zero otherwise. Truman’s classification excludes four funds covered
by our sample (Investment Corporation of Dubai, Dubai International Financial
Center, IPIC fromAbu Dhabi, and Mumtalakat from Bahrain). We classify those
funds as “political funds,” on the basis of their own disclosures and analysis by
the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. Our core results are robust to reclassifying
these funds and to excluding these funds from our sample (cumulatively, these
funds account for 40 of the 1,018 transactions in our sample).
As an alternative measure of political interference, we create a “political
index” (SWF political index). We construct this index by first adding the scores
to Truman (2008) question nine (“Is the role of the government in setting the
investment strategy of the SWF clearly established”), question ten (“Is the role
of the managers in executing the investment strategy clearly established?”),
and question eleven (“Are decisions on specific investments made by the
managers?”). We compute the final index as three minus the sum of the scores
13 Because of the amount of effort involved in collecting reliable data on director appointments, we collect these
data only for a matched sample of private sector investments (not for the entire set of benchmark transactions),
resembling SWF investments in terms of both target and deal characteristics, as described in Section 3.
14 The difference in the overall sample is likely driven partly by our inclusion of Norway’s investments in the
sample, as the fund never assumes seats (if we exclude Norway, our proportion estimates approaches 13%).
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assigned by Truman (2008) for questions nine, ten, and eleven, so our political
index ranges from zero to three, in quarter point increments, with higher values
indicating more political interference. As above, we classify the four funds not
included in Truman (2008) as having the highest value on the political index.
Table 2 shows that SWFs are quite evenly split in terms of managerial
independence, with 11 out of 19 classified as “political.” Not surprisingly, we
find lower scores for political interference in SWFs originating from advanced
OECD countries, such as Norway, Australia, and Korea. An effective shield
against political interference is also in place at the Kuwait InvestmentAuthority
and the Singaporean funds Temasek and GIC. However, nine funds from
different regions operate under strict government control.
One limitation of our classification scheme is that the scores are recorded at
a single point in time, the year 2008. Accordingly, our investigation allows for
cross-sectional comparison, but no time-series variation within each SWF’s
investment portfolio. We are somewhat reassured, on the other hand, by the
fact that subsequent studies (Truman 2011; Bagnall and Truman 2011) find
little variation across time. Bagnall and Truman (2011) document a slight
improvement in question nine, but they warn of the improvement being possibly
due to self-reporting bias.
2.4 The benchmark sample
We construct a “benchmark sample” to draw a comparison between SWF
investments and similar investments by other, non-government-owned financial
firms. We obtain this sample by downloading, from the Thomson Reuters
SDC Platinum Mergers & Acquisitions Database (SDC), a dataset including
all investments with announcement dates between December 1, 1980 and
November 1, 2012, with a publicly traded target and with the acquirer having
a Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code between 6000 and 6999, as an
identifier for financial firms. As a first filter, we only keep transactions in which
the acquirer originates from one of the fifteen countries in which SWF acquirers
in our sample are based and for which the target firm is headquartered in one of
the 54 countries in which SWF investment targets are headquartered. We further
exclude transactions classified as leveraged buyouts, recapitalizations, self-
tender offers, exchange offers, repurchases, and privatizations; we also exclude
all instances of debt restructurings (transactions with an acquisition technique
labeled as “debt restructuring” or with an acquirer labeled as “creditor”).15
Transactions with the status listed as “rumor,” “discontinued rumor,” “status
unknown,” “seeking buyer,” or “seeking buyer withdrawn” are also excluded,
as are all deals with SWF involvement, either marked as “SWF Involvement
Buyside” or “SWF Involvement Sellside” or manually identified as having as
15 These filters are standard in empirical studies using the SDC database. For example, the same filters are used in
Ferreira, Massa, and Matos (2010), but there the authors further exclude all minority acquisitions. Similarly, the
same filters are applied by Karolyi and Liao (2014), but there the authors further exclude all domestic deals.
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a buyer or seller a SWF, a SWF subsidiary, or a SWF investment vehicles.
We further exclude all deals in which the immediate or ultimate parent of
either the target or the buyer is identified as “government.” Finally, we exclude
all transactions for which the target does not have a Datastream code and all
transactions with individuals as acquirers. The resulting sample contains 5,975
observations with a total deal value of $224 billion.
2.5 Variable definitions and data sources
A table listing all variables, variable definitions, and data sources can
be found as Table A1 in the Appendix. Deal-based variables (such as
Deal value and Deal stake) originate from the SIL SWF Database, the
construction of which is described in Section 2.1. Target-specific variables
(Total assets, Return on assets, Quick ratio, Closely held shares, Sales
growth, Debt to assets, and Market to book) are obtained from the
Thomson Reuters Worldscope (Worldscope) database, in U.S. dollars; data
on directors are collected as described in Section 2.2. In the descriptive
statistics and matching procedures, we present and employ target metrics
as of December 31 of the year prior to the investment. Dollar-denominated
metrics (as opposed to ratios) are scaled to 2000 U.S. dollars using the
Consumer Price Index (All Urban Consumers) from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
Daily stock price performance data and daily local equity index values are
obtained from the Thomson Reuters Datastream (Datastream) database; in
particular, we employ the Total return index, in U.S. dollars, to compute daily
returns for both individual equities and associated market indices. Finally, we
collect country-specific data for both acquirer and target nations from a plurality
of sources: GDP per capita (defined as the target-country GDP in 2000 USD
divided by national population), GDP growth, and Market capitalization to
GDP (defined as the total market capitalization of all publicly listed domestic
firms divided by GDP) are from the World Bank.
We further use a variable measuring legal origin (Target country common
law), identifying “common law” legal origin from La Porta et al. (1998) and
variables measuring the level of democracy from the Polity IV Project (Acquirer
country democracy and Target country democracy, defined as the difference
between the “Democracy” and “Autarchy” scores). The same metric of the
level of democracy derived from the Polity IV dataset has been widely used in
the “law and finance” literature, for example, Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, and
Maksimovic (2006) and Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005).
Anecdotal evidence suggests that SWFs were very active in Western markets
during the recent financial crisis. To explore whether there is a systematic
tendency for SWFs to play a more active role as investors during crises,
and to prevent such tendency from affecting our estimate of the impact of
SWFs on firm value, we control for the impact of banking crises both on
the SWF investment process and on firm value and performance. Banking
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crises are identified using the methodology described by Laeven and Valencia
(2010, 2012). The related dataset lists banking crises across the world from
1970 to 2012, and identifies the countries and years during which banking
crises took place, based on two conditions: (1) significant signs of financial
distress in the banking system (as indicated by significant bank runs, losses
in the banking system, and bank liquidations) and (2) significant banking
policy intervention measures in response to significant losses in the banking
system.
2.6 Univariate comparisons between SWF and benchmark samples
Since we focus on comparing the impact of SWF investments on firm value
to the impact of private-sector financial investors, it is important to first
understand if and how SWF investments differ from private-sector investments.
Simple descriptive statistics, although not conclusive, help to identify possible
systematic preferences in SWF target selection.
Table 3, panel A, reports mean, median, and number of observations for
all continuous variables for both the SWF and benchmark samples. This panel
also presents t−statistics for a test of differences between SWF and benchmark
sample means, computed with standard errors clustered at the investment target
level. The mean (median) value of SWF investments, $408.45 million ($18.65
million), is significantly greater than the $49.56 million ($8.19 million) value
for benchmark investments, but the 8.45% mean (1.23% median) stake acquired
by SWFs is significantly smaller than the 22.60% mean (12.09% median) stake
acquired by benchmark investors.16 Consistently, SWFs tend to invest in larger
firms: the mean (median) total value of assets of SWF investment targets is
$82.83 billion ($3.46 billion), compared with $1.77 billion ($96.68 million)
for the benchmark sample. SWF investment targets also tend to have higher
return on assets but lower liquidity and sales growth, and SWFs tend to invest
in countries that are more developed (higher democracy score and GDP per
capita) but have lower GDP growth.
Panel B of Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for binary variables in both the
SWF and benchmark samples, with the related z-statistic from a binomial test
of differences in proportions between the two samples. Out of the 1,018 (5,975)
investments in the SWF (benchmark) sample, 87.76% (16.64%) are foreign,
4.4% (12.71%) involve acquisition of a controlling stake exceeding 50% of
shares outstanding, 62.57% (59.55%) are initial investments in a specific target,
75.34% (62.41%) involve an acquirer from a common-law country, 13.27%
(13.46%) are capital injections, and 49.36% (3.87%) are initiated during a
banking or financial crisis.
16 Investments by Norway’s GPFG are generally smaller than those of other SWFs, both in terms of size of the
stake acquired and deal value. Excluding Norway from the SWF sample increases mean (median) stake acquired
to 15.33% (7.8%) and the mean (median) deal value to $741.23 million ($116.41 million), though both the mean
and median still remain significantly smaller than those of private investments.
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Table 3
Continued
Panel B: Binary variables
SWF sample Benchmark sample Difference
Variable Proportion N Proportion N Proportion z
Foreign 87.76% 894 16.64% 4,981 71.12% 39.14∗∗∗
Control 4.40% 38 12.71% 548 −8.31% −8.57∗∗∗
First investment 62.57% 637 59.55% 3,558 3.02% 1.30
Target country common 75.34% 767 62.41% 3,729 12.93% 4.46∗∗∗
Capital injection 13.27% 135 13.46% 804 −0.19% −0.13
Crisis 49.36% 502 3.87% 231 45.49% 14.31∗∗∗
Panel C: Industrial distribution of investments
SWF sample Benchmark sample
Industry Proportion N Proportion N
Oil and gas 7.11% 72 3.51% 210
Basic materials 6.80% 69 13.88% 829
Industrials 18.17% 185 19.02% 1,136
Consumer goods 8.32% 85 12.01% 718
Health care 5.28% 54 4.10% 245
Consumer services 11.17% 114 11.51% 688
Telecommunications 3.65% 37 1.11% 66
Utilities 3.65% 37 1.58% 94
Financials 29.54% 301 25.52% 1,525
Technology 6.29% 64 7.78% 465
Missing 3.24% 33 0.37% 22
This table includes descriptive statistics for the sample of SWF investments and the related benchmark sample
of investments by private-sector financial institutions from the same countries. Panel A contains mean, median,
and number of observations for each of the continuous variables for both samples, and results from a t-test for
differences in means, with standard errors clustered at the target-firm level. Panel B contains the proportion (out
of the total number of nonmissing observations) and count of the instances in which a binary variable assumes
the value of one and the results from a binomial test for differences in proportions. Panel C details the proportion
(out of the total number of nonmissing observations) and count of investments by target industry (based on the
Industry Classification Benchmark by FTSE International). Variables are as defined in Table A1 in the Appendix.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level.
The industrial distribution of investments is described in Table 3, panel C.
SWF investments are heavily focused on the financial industry (29.54% of
all investments) and on industrials (18.17%). The benchmark sample reveals
similar patterns, with 25.52% of all investments in financials and 19.02%
industrials. We also examine, but do not report, the temporal and geographic
distributions of investments. Investments in our sample span 1983 to 2012.
While both SWF and benchmark samples are biased toward more recent
years, this bias is more pronounced in the SWF sample, with approximately
half of these observations being initiated after January 2008. Finally, SWF
investments are concentrated in the United States (44.32% of the total), though
this largely reflects the impact of investments by Norway’s GFPG; excluding
these, U.S.-headquartered target firms account for 11.88% of the number of
SWF investments. China, Singapore, India, and the United Kingdom are the
next most common targets of SWF investments, with the first two of these
involving mostly domestic deals.
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3. The Short-Term Market Impact of SWF Investments
We examine the valuation impact of SWF investments on target firms, both
absolute and relative to comparable private-sector investments, in two ways.
First, we measure the impact of investment announcements using event-study
methods. Second, we measure the long-term impact of investments on long-
term operating performance. We present event-study results in this section.
Our main proxy for the impact of SWF investments on firm value is the
abnormal return at the time of the investment announcement. Cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) are computed by subtracting the market-model
expected return from the target firm’s stock total return over various intervals on
and around the day on which the announcement of the investment occurs (day
0).17 We compute market-model expected returns by first estimating model
parameters using daily returns over the year (250 trading days) ending 20
trading days prior to the announcement date. We present results for the event
day (day 0) but also for the three- (−1,+1) and eleven-day (−5,+5) event
windows; in our discussion, we emphasize the three-day window (−1,+1) to
capture the effect of possible previous-day leakage of information or next-day
reaction (common when announcements occur “after hours” or in distant time
zones), while avoiding the increased noise of the longer event window.
Results for the full sample of SWF investments are presented in Table 4, panel
A. We are able to compute three-day abnormal returns for 796 observations out
of the total sample (1,018 observations); observations are excluded from the
analysis if return data are missing during the event window or if there are
fewer than twenty nonmissing daily data points during the estimation period.
The mean (median) three-day CAR is 0.84% (0.07%). We test the statistical
significance of mean abnormal returns using the bootstrapped, skewness-
adjusted t−test described by Hall (1992) and Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999)
to correct for the skewness of abnormal returns, and we employ a generalized
sign test for medians.18 All results are statistically significant at the 1% or 5%
level over the one- and three-day event windows based on both tests; over
the eleven-day event window, the mean abnormal returns are insignificant at
conventional levels, whereas the median is significant at the 5% level.
Norway’s GPFG is often cited as being different from other SWFs, both in
terms of internal organization and investment style.19 Accordingly, Dewenter,
Han, and Malatesta (2010) check whether their results are driven by GPFG
17 Total returns for securities and local market indices are obtained from Datastream and are adjusted for dividends
and splits. While returns are computed in U.S. dollars, for both individual securities and local-market indices,
unreported robustness tests verify that results are unaffected by this conversion.
18 For robustness, we also employ the standard Patell’s z test for significance of mean CARs, the crude-dependence
adjusted (CDA) t-statistic proposed by Brown and Warner (1985) for means, and a nonparametric Wilcoxon
sign-rank test for the significance of medians. All tests indicate high levels of statistical significance for the one-
and three-day event windows, but they offer mixed evidence over the longer window.
19 Norway’s GPFG is often hailed as being the most professionally managed and most transparent SWF. Various
studies have focused on its structure and behavior (Caner and Grennes 2009; Ang, Goetzmann, and Schaefer
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Table 4
Short-term market reaction to announcements of SWF and benchmark investments
Panel A. All sovereign wealth fund investments
Interval Obs. Mean cumulative Bootstrapped, Median cumulative Generalized
abnormal return skewness-adjusted t abnormal return sign z
(0,0) 795 0.95% 3.809∗∗∗ 0.04% 2.297∗∗
(−1,+1) 796 0.84% 2.345∗∗∗ 0.07% 2.262∗∗
(−5,+5) 799 0.55% 0.953 0.12% 2.513∗∗
Panel B. Sovereign wealth fund investments, excluding Norway
(0,0) 399 1.95% 4.160∗∗∗ 0.12% 2.638∗∗∗
(−1,+1) 400 2.38% 4.154∗∗∗ 0.50% 4.195∗∗∗
(−5,+5) 403 1.68% 1.751∗∗ 0.22% 2.643∗∗∗
Panel C. Benchmark investments
(0,0) 4,823 2.53% 17.475∗∗∗ 0.14% 13.165∗∗∗
(−1,+1) 4,830 4.82% 22.104∗∗∗ 0.92% 19.202∗∗∗
(−5,+5) 4,843 7.09% 9.776∗∗∗ 2.54% 21.408∗∗∗
This table includes cumulative abnormal stock returns, computed in U.S. dollars, for target firms’ common
equity on the days surrounding the announcement of an investment. Daily abnormal returns are computed using
a market model with parameters estimated over 250 trading days ending 20 trading days prior to the investment
announcement. “Interval” indicates the time interval of interest relative to the date of the announcement of the
investment (day 0). Observations (Obs.) reports the number of observations. “Mean cumulative abnormal return”
and “Median cumulative abnormal return” report, respectively, average and median abnormal cumulative returns.
“Bootstrapped, skewness-adjusted t” presents the skewness-adjustedt-statistic employed by Hall (1992) with p-
values computed with nonparametric bootstraps. “Generalized sign z” reports the test statistic of a generalized
nonparametric sign test for medians. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level.
Panel A includes all announcements of SWF investments in publicly traded companies; panel B includes all
announcements of SWF investments in publicly traded companies, excluding those made by Norway’s SWF;
and panel C includes all investment announcements for the benchmark sample of investments by private-sector
financial firms.
investments by presenting core estimates from subsamples excluding GPFG.
This is even more important here, as investments by GPFG account for almost
half of the total number of investments in our sample. Accordingly, panel B
replicates the event-study analysis, while excluding investments by Norway’s
GPFG. This increases estimated CARs substantially: over the three-day event
window, the mean CAR for SWF investments is 2.38% and the median CAR is
0.50%, both significant at the 1% level, whereas the eleven-day mean and
median CARs are 1.68% and 0.22%, significant at the 5% and 1% level,
respectively. Overall, these results indicate that the market reaction to SWF
investments is, on average, positive and significant in both statistical and
economic terms. These results are consistent with, but somewhat lower than,
those in Dewenter, Han, and Malatesta (2010), who report mean three-day
CARs of 1.52% (versus our 0.89%). Our estimates are closer to those reported
by Kotter and Lel (2011), who estimate three-day CARs of 2.25%, similar to our
2009; Chambers, Dimson, and Ilmanen 2012), finding that its management, while reporting periodically to the
government, is better insulated from political interference than any other SWF leadership team. In terms of
investment style, GPFG makes exclusively foreign investments and has always committed to acquiring small
stakes—although the exact definition of “small” has varied over time, once signifying no more than 1% of equity,
now mostly restricted to below 5%. While GPFG has long been seen as the prototypical passive investor, there
are recent signs of increased activism.
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estimate of 2.38%, in which Norway is excluded, which is the best comparison
as their sample contains only one investment by the Norwegian SWF.
Panel C of Table 4 focuses on the benchmark sample. Three-day mean and
median CARs are, respectively, 4.82% and 0.92%, whereas eleven-day mean
and median CARs are 7.09% and 2.54%; all CARs are significant at the 1%
level. We do not test the statistical significance of differences between the
market reaction to SWF investments and the market reaction to benchmark
investments here, but note that the difference appears substantial, with the
reaction to SWF investments appearing far smaller.
For robustness, we replicate but do not report the same analysis by computing
raw (unadjusted, rather than abnormal) returns, market-adjusted abnormal
returns, and buy-and-hold (rather than cumulative) abnormal returns. We should
note that, for both the SWF and benchmark sample, the mean β parameter
estimated in market models is not statistically different from one. Given this,
and due to the short event windows involved, the main results are similar, with
all samples displaying positive and statistically significant abnormal returns.
4. Decomposing and Explaining the SWF Discount
The descriptive results presented in Section 2 indicate substantial differences
between investments by SWFs and investments by private-sector financial
investors, both in terms of target firm characteristics and deal characteristics.
These differences could, in turn, affect the market reaction, creating potential
problems in attributing causation. Accordingly, we first identify potential
systematic differences in the investment target selection process by SWFs and
then control for those differences by propensity score matching and propensity
score-weighted regressions.
4.1 Decomposition of returns into target, deal, and SWF factors
The event-study results suggest that the value impact of SWF investors, while
positive, is smaller than that of private sector investors. Yet descriptive statistics
also reveal that SWF acquisitions differ significantly from those by private
financial investors: SWFs tend to target larger firms (higher total assets) and
more profitable firms (higher return on assets) than do PS investors, but they also
tend to acquire smaller stakes and assume control less frequently. To formally
test the valuation impact of SWFs, while accounting for possible differences
in sample composition, we decompose this difference in value impact—
which we call, for brevity, a “discount”—into three components, due to target
characteristics (target discount), deal characteristics (deal discount), and, most
importantly, the fact that the investor is a SWF (SWF discount), respectively.As
in the event study, our proxy for the value impact of investments is the three-
day cumulative abnormal return surrounding an investment announcement,
computed using a market-model, which we refer to simply as the “abnormal
return” or “CAR.”
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Table 5
Decomposition of announcement period abnormal returns
Panel A: All observations
N Mean CAR (−1, +1) t
SWF 558 0.50% 0.59
Match1: Random 558 4.03%∗∗∗ 5.70
Match 2: Target characteristics 558 1.10% 1.18
Match 3: Target and deal characteristics 558 1.81%∗ 1.85
Total discount (SWF - match 1) 558 −3.53%∗∗ −2.70
Target discount (match 2 - match 1) 558 −2.93%∗∗ −2.14
Deal discount (match 3 - match 2) 558 0.71%∗∗ 2.45
SWF discount (SWF - match 3) 558 −1.31%∗∗∗ −3.77
Panel B: Excluding Norway
SWF 261 2.05%∗∗∗ 4.71
Match 1: Random 261 3.77%∗∗ 2.61
Match 2: Target characteristics 261 2.77%∗∗∗ 6.02
Match 3: Target and deal Characteristics 261 3.44%∗∗∗ 4.73
Total discount (SWF - match 1) 261 −1.73% −1.03
Target discount (match 2 - match 1) 261 −1.00% −0.59
Deal discount (match 3 - match 2) 261 0.66% 1.06
SWF discount (SWF - match 3) 261 −1.39%∗ −1.93
This table includes mean cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs), in U.S. dollars, for target firms’ common
equity on the days surrounding the announcement of an investment. Daily abnormal returns are computed using
a market model with parameters estimated over 250 trading days ending 20 trading days prior to the investment
announcement. Returns are cumulated over the three-day trading period surrounding the announcement of the
investment (day 0). Cumulative abnormal returns are computed for the sample of SWF investments for which
matched observations and returns data are available. Match 1 is a sample of randomly drawn private sector
investments. Match 2 is a sample of private sector investments matched on target characteristics, as described
in model 1 in Table A2 in the Appendix. Match 3 is a sample of private sector investments matched on target
and deal characteristics, as described in model 2 in Table A2 in the Appendix. Cumulative abnormal returns
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles; means are tested using t-statistics computed with standard errors
clustered at the SWF level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level. Panel A includes
all announcements of SWF investments in publicly traded companies; panel B includes all announcements of
SWF investments in publicly traded companies, but excluding those made by Norway’s SWF.
We first estimate the “total discount.” To that end, for each SWF investment,
we identify a randomly drawn investment from the sample of private sector
investments. We then compute the difference between the mean abnormal return
for the SWF sample (0.50%) and for this set of randomly matched investments
(4.03%). Here, abnormal returns are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles,
leading to somewhat smaller abnormal return estimates than the ones presented
in Table 4 for both SWF and matched samples. Another difference between the
abnormal returns estimated in Tables 4 and 5 originates from the fact that, in
Table 5, we only include the 558 SWF investments for which we were able
to identify matched observations with nonmissing three-day abnormal returns
(we include only observations for which we are able to identify all three sets of
matches, as described in more detail below). As reported in panel A of Table 5,
the estimated total discount is −3.53%. Cross-sectional t-tests with standard
errors clustered at the SWF level and robust to heteroskedasticity reveal that
the result is statistically significant at the 5% level.
The second step of our return decomposition is to identify a series of matched
investments resembling SWFs in terms of target characteristics. To do so, we
rely on propensity score matching: we first determine how SWF investments
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differ on the basis of observable target characteristics and then pick, for a
reduced benchmark sample, private sector investments whose targets most
resemble the targets selected by SWFs. Propensity score matching is not new
in the empirical corporate finance literature. For example, Campello, Graham,
and Harvey (2010) use the technique to investigate the impact of financial
constraints on firms: for each “constrained” firm in their sample, they identify
a nonconstrained firm matched on size, ownership, ratings, and industry.
Fernandes (2014) applies the methodology in a study of the long-term impact of
SWF investments on the operating performance of investment targets. Whereas
we aim at identifying matched transactions, Fernardes identifies matched firms
using country, industry, size, and performance metrics. Accordingly, to model
SWF investment preferences, we estimate coefficients of a probit model, in
which the response is a binary variable that assumes the value of one when
the investor is a SWF and the value of zero when the investor is a non-
government-owned financial entity. The set of predictors includes firm and
country characteristics. In selecting the exact metrics to use, we attempt to
replicate—as much as data availability constraints permit—the set of predictors
that previous literature on foreign investors have found meaningful, with an eye
on the set of variables utilized by Kotter and Lel (2011). The models include
industry and year controls, while standard errors are clustered at the investment-
target level.20 To mitigate the impact of outliers, all continuous variables are
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of the distribution.
Unreported estimation results for a sample of 3,807 SWF and benchmark
observations with nonmissing data are included in Appendix Table A2 and
indicate that the probability of an acquirer being a SWF increases if the target
is large (greater Total assets) and if the target is foreign, based in a common-
law country, and with abnormally high stock returns over the previous year.
Further, the probability of an acquirer being a SWF increases during a banking
or financial crisis. These results are consistent with some of the findings of
Kotter and Lel (2011), who also document a SWF preference for large targets
headquartered in developed countries and for crisis periods. However, while
Kotter and Lel (2011) find that SWFs invest in financially constrained firms with
weak abnormal stock price performance over the prior year, we find that a strong
abnormal stock price performance increases the probability of an acquirer being
a SWF, rather than a private-sector financial investor.21
20 The coefficient estimates and statistical significance testing are executed by using SAS and, in
particular, the “proc surverylogistic” procedure that employs maximum-likelihood estimates and resampling
methods to estimate standard errors in the presence of clustered data and categorical explanatory
variables. This allows us to estimate consistent probit coefficients with year and industry controls
and test for significance in the presence of clustering. For more information, please refer to
http:// support.sas.com/documentation/cdl/en/statug/63033/HTML/default/viewer.htm#statug_surveylogistic_
sect001.htm.
21 While Kotter and Lel (2011) similarly investigate selection criteria in SWF investments, there are substantial
differences in the design of our analysis, possibly accounting for differences in findings. Kotter and Lel (2011)
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Once we have estimated this probit model, we compute a probability score
by fitting the estimated coefficients to the dataset. Finally, we select, with
replacement, the private sector investment matched to each SWF investment
with the closest probability score.22 Effectively, we identify a sample of
private sector investments that share similar target characteristics to those of
SWF investments. To estimate the discount component attributable to target
characteristics, we compute the mean difference between abnormal returns
on this target-characteristics matched sample and the abnormal returns on
the randomly matched sample. The rationale is that any systematic residual
difference between the abnormal returns of the two sets of matches should be
due to target characteristics. The estimated target discount component is equal to
-2.93% (statistically significant at 5%), indicating that target firm characteristics
account for a large portion of the total discount.
To compute the discount component attributable to deal characteristics,
we repeat the matching procedure described above, but this time we add
deal characteristic variables to the probit model (Stake, Control, Capital
injection, First investment, and Control); this reduces the count of observations
with nonmissing data to 2,886 and thus identifies a set of private sector
investments matched on the basis of both target and deal characteristics. We
then compute the mean difference between abnormal returns on this target- and
deal-characteristics-matched sample and the abnormal returns on the target-
characteristics-matched sample. The rationale is that any systematic residual
difference between the abnormal returns of the two sets of matches should be
due to deal characteristics. The estimated deal component of the total discount
is actually positive, at 0.71%, and also statistically significant at 5%.
Finally, to estimate the component of the discount attributable to SWFs,
we compute the mean difference between the abnormal returns on the SWF
sample and the target- and deal-characteristics-matched sample. As above,
any systematic residual difference (after accounting for target and deal
characteristics) is attributable to the identity of the investor. We find that this
component, labeled the “SWF discount,” is equal to −1.31% and is highly
statistically significant.
As in the event study, we are concerned about this SWF discount being
driven by investments of the Norwegian GPFG, both because of the small
stakes that the fund tends to acquire (which could potentially justify a weaker
aim at identifying a benchmark set of firms, while we focus on a benchmark set of transactions. Accordingly,
their benchmark includes all firms in the Worldscope database for which data are available. As we are interested
in finding a comparable set of investments, our benchmark sample includes a set of comparable private-sector
investments.
22 We verify that the matched transactions are indeed similar to SWF investments by testing for differences in average
propensity scores: we find no statistically significant difference in propensity scores between the two samples.
Propensity score matching with replacement is recommended by Roberts and Whited (2012). In robustness tests,
we also match without replacement. While our findings are virtually identical (we estimate a significant SWF
discount of similar magnitude), a comparison of propensity scores between the SWF and matched sample reveals
that the matching (without replacement) procedure is not as accurate, as expected.
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market reaction) and because of the large proportion of investments related
to the Norwegian SWF in our sample. Accordingly, in panel B of Table 5,
we replicate the same steps but exclude investments by Norway’s SWF and
the related matches from our analysis. In this data subset, we estimate a SWF
discount of slightly larger magnitude (−1.39%), and it is statistically significant
at the 10% level.
These decompositions indicate that, while target characteristics account for
a portion of the smaller market reaction observed in conjunction with SWF
investments, the residual “SWF discount” is both statistically and economically
significant. We should note that our methodology allows us to control for
observable systematic differences in target selection and in the structure of
SWF investment deals. A limitation, perhaps unavoidable, lies in the fact
that we are unable to control for possible unobservable differences in target
selection and deal design. Yet, as Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010)
discuss in some detail, matching estimators can mitigate problems related to
what they call “uncontrolled firm heterogeneity.” That is because, to the extent
that relevant unobserved characteristics are likely to be correlated to observed
characteristics, unobserved heterogeneity is likely to be lower in a matched
sample. Nevertheless, we need to recognize that we cannot, by definition, fully
account for the impact of unobserved target and deal characteristics but instead
only mitigate their confounding effects.
4.2 Regression analysis of short-term market reactions
The event-study analysis and the return decomposition indicate that the
valuation impact of SWFs is smaller than that of private-sector investors, thus
suggesting that there is a discount associated with the identity of the investing
SWF. This evidence is clearly inconsistent with the hypothesis that SWFs have
a more beneficial impact on investment targets than private sector investors
because of a hypothetical ability to monitor more effectively the behavior
of management. On the other hand, this evidence is consistent with both the
political agenda and the passive investor hypotheses, as both predict a discount
in firm valuation. We shed light on this issue by examining the determinants of
the abnormal market reaction using regression analysis to discriminate between
these two competing predictions.
As the descriptive analysis reveals, SWF investments are not random. Rather,
SWF investments differ systematically from private investments, both in terms
of target and deal characteristics. To minimize the impact of this selection
process on the analysis presented here, coefficients are estimated by a weighted
least squares procedure in which the weights are inversely proportional to the
probability of an investment belonging to the SWF or benchmark sample.23
For each transaction, the “propensity score” pˆ is an estimate of the conditional
23 Caliendo and Kopening (2008) discuss applications of propensity-score-weighting techniques and the related
literature.
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probability of finding that the acquirer is a SWF, derived from the probit model
discussed in Section 3 and Appendix Table A2. A transaction with a SWF
acquirer receives a weight w so that w=1/pˆ, whereas a transaction with private-
sector acquirers receive a weight w so that w=1/(1−pˆ). Intuitively, propensity
score weighting assigns a lower weight to SWF observations, which are “very
different” (in terms of target and deal characteristics) from the benchmark
sample and, similarly, gives a lower weight to benchmark observations, which
are “very different” from the SWF sample, effectively reducing the impact of
sample selection on the coefficient estimates.
In our regression model, the response variable is the three-day, market-
model adjusted, cumulative abnormal return, as described in Section 3. The
first predictor of interest is a binary variable equal to one for investments by
SWFs and zero otherwise. The coefficient associated with this variable offers an
estimate of the discount associated with SWF investments. While the superior
monitor hypothesis (SMH) and passive investor hypothesis (PIH) predict that
the market reaction to SWF investments will be stronger for domestic deals,
because the funds will be able to exercise better monitoring and receive less
pressure toward passivity, the political agenda hypothesis (PAH) predicts that
the value impact of SWFs will be lower domestically, as SWFs are more
able to exercise a potentially value-decreasing political influence. Accordingly,
we include an interaction between the SWF binary variable and a binary
variable identifying foreign investments. As we add an interaction between this
SWF identifier and a binary variable identifying foreign investments (SWF ×
Foreign), the coefficient estimate associated with SWF should be interpreted as
an estimate of the discount associated with SWF domestic investments, whereas
the discount associated with SWF foreign investments should be estimated by
the sum of that coefficient and the coefficient on the SWF × Foreign interaction.
As all of the hypotheses predict a relation between the valuation impact and
the stake acquired by the SWF, we also interact the SWF identifier with the
size of the stake acquired. Further, to test whether the impact of SWFs on
firm valuation is conditional on the presence of other block holders, we add an
interaction between the proportion of closely held shares and the SWF binary
variable. Finally, given that SWFs could be pushed into a more passive stance
if originating from a nondemocratic country, potentially viewed as threatening,
we add an interaction between an index of country democracy and the SWF
binary variable.
As additional control variables, we add a series of variables that extant
literature has documented affecting the market reaction around investment
announcements for all (not just SWF) investors: deal based variables (Foreign,
Capital injection, and Stake), target-level controls (Total assets, Return on
assets, Closely held shares, Debt to assets, and Market to book), and buy-
and-hold abnormal returns computed over the year prior to the announcement
of the SWF investment. We also add country-level controls (GDP growth, log
of GDP per capita, Market cap to GDP, Target country democracy, and Target
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country common) and a binary variable identifying banking crises (Crisis).
Industry, country, and year fixed-effects are included, and standard errors are
clustered at the investment-target and year levels. As in previous analyses, to
mitigate the impact of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the
1st and 99th percentiles of the distribution.
We present results of this regression analysis in Table 6. We have complete
data for 391 SWF observations and for 1,114 benchmark observations.24
As the first model presented in Table 6 reveals, the coefficient estimate
associated with the SWF variable is negative and highly statistically and
economically significant, indicating a discount of approximately −5.28%
associated with domestic SWF investment. On the other hand, the coefficient
estimate associated with the SWF × Foreign interaction is 4.74%. Hence, while
domestic SWF investments are associated with a much lower market reaction
than are private-sector investments (a discount of −5.28%), the estimated
discount is smaller for foreign SWF investments: −0.54% (the sum of the two
coefficients, −5.28% and 4.74%). This deeper discount for domestic deals is
consistent with the political agenda hypothesis, as we expect SWFs to be under
greater pressure to pursue political goals (such as employment maximization
or the development of specific sectors) when investing domestically.
In a second model, we add two binary variables identifying specific SWF
types: Norway and “political” SWFs, classified as described in Section 2.
We further add interactions with these two binary variables as we previously
did for the SWF identifier. The model thus estimated confirms the previous
findings, but leads to a more nuanced effect on the interaction with Stake.
While the size of the stake acquired is positively related to the market reaction
when the investor is the Norwegian SWF, it is negatively related to the
market reaction when the investor is a “political” fund and is not related
to the size of the stake acquired by other SWFs. This result is also highly
consistent with the PAH, as it points to the fact that the discount is a feature
of domestic investments and of investments by political funds (domestic and
foreign). Finally, we note that the interaction between the Norway identifier
and Closely held shares is associated with a positive and statistically significant
coefficient, suggesting that, in the presence of other blockholders, investments
by the Norwegian SWF lead to a higher market reaction. While the result
is statistically significant, the coefficient is fairly small, indicating limited
economic significance.
In the third model, we replace the binary variable identifying political SWFs
with the Political Index discussed in Section 2. We find that the interaction
between this index and Stake is associated with a negative and significant
24 In unreported analyses, we test the representativeness of the sample subset of SWF investments with complete
regression data. The event-study analysis offers mixed results, as the market reaction is close to zero (negative
but not statistically significant) over the standard three-day event window but is positive (circa 0.50%) and
statistically significant on the announcement day. Most importantly, we take reassurance in finding that the
discount decomposition indicates a total discount of −4.39% and a SWF discount of −0.54%.
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Table 6
Regression analysis of short-term market reactions, full sample
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variable CAR (−1,+1) CAR (−1,+1) CAR (−1,+1) CAR (−1,+1)
Intercept −1.1212∗∗ −0.7880 −0.931∗∗ −0.4838
(−2.48) (−1.54) (−2.06) (−0.97)
SWF −0.0528∗∗∗ −0.0538∗∗ 0.0231 −0.0716∗∗∗
(−2.62) (−2.44) (0.31) (−3.28)
SWF Norway 0.0059 −0.0649 0.0480
(0.12) (−0.86) −0.98
SWF political index 0.0072 −0.07 −0.01
(SWF political index in Model 3) (0.09) (−1.04) (−0.11)
Foreign −0.0192 −0.0214 −0.0224∗ −0.0238∗
(−1.53) (−1.63) (−1.73) (−1.82)
SWF × Foreign 0.0474∗∗ 0.057∗∗ 0.0363 0.0913∗∗∗
(2.22) (2.11) (0.51) (3.33)
SWF political dummy −0.0601 0.01 −0.0100∗∗
(SWF political index in Model 3) × Foreign (−1.13) (0.2) (−2.09)
Stake (Control in Model 4) 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0760∗∗∗
(6.73) (6.53) (6.52) −5.88
SWF × Stake (Control in Model 4) 0.0003 0.0007 0.0024∗∗ 0.1030∗∗∗
(0.55) (1.11) (2.47) (3.15)
SWF Norway × Stake (Control in Model 4) 0.0195∗ 0.018∗ NA
(1.88) (1.75) NA
SWF political dummy (SWF political index −0.0028∗∗∗ −0.0018∗∗∗ −0.2754∗∗∗
in M3) × Stake (Control in M4) (−4.05) (−3.94) (−6.26)
CHS ∼−0.0001 ∼−0.0001 ∼−0.0001 ∼−0.0001
(−0.11) (−0.08) (−0.08) (−0.25)
SWF× CHS 0.0002 −0.0001 −0.0007∗ −0.0007∗∗∗
(0.76) (−0.31) (−1.81) (−2.60)
SWF political dummy 0.0002 0.0008 0.0015∗∗∗
(SWF political index in Model 4) × CHS (0.5) (1.64) −2.82
SWF Norway × CHS 0.001∗∗ 0.0007∗∗ 0.0008∗
(1.97) (2.46) −1.94
Acquirer country democracy 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 −0.0002
(0.39) (0.3) (0.25) (−0.20)
SWF × Acquirer country democracy 0.0008 −0.0010 0.0006 −0.0050
(0.52) (−0.29) (0.14) (−1.29)
SWF political dummy −0.0027 ∼−0.0001 ∼−0.0001
(SWF political index in M3) × (−0.25) (−0.93) (−0.12)
Acquirer country democracy
Observations, benchmark 1114 1114 1114 1114
Observations, SWFs 391 391 391 391
Adj. R2 67.65% 67.96% 70.05% 68.36%
This table includes coefficient estimates obtained by weighted least-squares optimization with propensity-score-
derived weights, as in Caliendo and Kopening (2008). The response variable is the market-model cumulative
abnormal return over the three-day window surrounding an investments announcement. All predictors are
as described in Table A1 in the Appendix. Industry, target country, and year fixed effects are included, as
well as additional controls for deal characteristics (First investment and Capital injection), time-varying firm
characteristics (log of Total assets, Return on assets, Debt to assets, Sales growth, Quick ratio, and Buy-and-Hold
abnormal return over the previous year) and target country metrics (GDP Growth, log of GDP per capita, Market
cap to GDP, Target country democracy, Target country common, and Crisis), but related coefficient estimates are
omitted. In model 3, the SWF political dummy is replaced by the SWF political index (also in related interactions).
In model 4, Stake is replaced by Control (also in related interactions). Standard errors are robust and clustered
by investment target and year; t-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level.
coefficient, confirming our previous findings. Yet, in this model, we find that the
interaction between the SWF identifier and Stake has a positive and significant
coefficient estimate, while the SWF identifier and its interaction with the
Foreign binary variable do not appear significant.
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In a fourth model, we once more replicate the specification of the second
model, but replace the continuous Stake variable with a binary Control variable,
set equal to one when the size of the stake owned by the investor after the
announced transaction exceeds the 51% threshold. The results once more
confirm our previous findings but also reveal the dramatic impact of assuming
control of a SWF. While we find that a nonpolitical SWF assuming control
is associated with an abnormally positive market reaction (similar in size, but
greater in magnitude, than the effect associated with a private-sector investor),
the estimated marginal effect of a political SWF assuming control is a decrease
in the market reaction by a dramatic −27.54%.25 These results strongly support,
once more, the contention that the SWF discount is driven by their political
interference, which is more pressing domestically and when SWF management
is not truly independent. We should also note that we find that the market
reaction to SWF investments appears negatively related to Closely held shares
for nonpolitical SWFs, but that relation is positive if the acquirer is a political
SWF or Norway. In the models discussed, the Acquirer country democracy
variable is never significantly related to abnormal returns, either on its own or
in any of the interactions.
In additional cross-sectional analysis, we focus on a data subset: as described
in Section 4.1 above, we use propensity score matching to generate a sample
of private sector investments that is a close complement to the SWF sample
after adjusting for differences in deal and target characteristics. The purpose is
twofold. First, we aim at mitigating even further (in addition to the propensity
score weighing of coefficient estimates) sample selection issues. Second, we
aim to add to our analysis an important explanatory variable: a binary variable
equal to one if the investor (SWF or matched sample) acquires a seat on the
board of directors of the target firm, and zero if not. Given the necessity to collect
this data manually, we restrict our effort to the sample of SWF investments
and to the matched sample, rather than to the entire universe of benchmark
investments.
In the first model of Table 7, we return to the first model presented in Table 6
(not including identifiers for Norway nor political funds) and add to it a binary
variable identifying acquirers obtaining seats on the board of directors (Direc-
tor) and interactions between this variable and the SWF identifier (SWF ×
Director), between Director and Stake (Stake × Director), and the three-way
interaction SWF × Director × Stake. In this model, we find that the only
statistically significant result of interest is this three-way-interaction, indicating
that the negative market reaction is driven by SWF investments in which SWFs
obtain seats on the board of directors and is related, under those circumstances,
to the size of the stake acquired by the SWF. Economically, we estimate
25 We are unable to estimate the impact of Norway’s SWF assuming control, as that does not occur in our sample.
Similarly, in subsequent models, we are unable to estimate the impact of Norway’s SWF appointing a director
to the board, for the same reason.
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Table 7
Regression analysis of short-term market reactions, SWF investments and matched sample
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variable CAR (−1,+1) CAR (−1,+1) CAR (−1,+1) CAR (−1,+1)
Intercept −2.5796∗∗∗ −2.4329∗∗∗ −2.0705∗∗∗ −1.9154∗∗∗
(−3.65) (−2.95) (−2.95) (−2.25)
SWF −0.0035 0.0048 −0.0352 −0.0061
(−0.13) (0.17) (−0.33) (−0.25)
SWF Norway 0.0263 −0.0637 0.0467
(0.56) (−0.88) 0.97)
SWF political index −0.0845 0.0401 −0.0937
(SWF political index in Model 3) (−0.93) (0.39) (−1.02)
Foreign 0.0037 0.0023 0.0032 0.0045
(0.16) (0.1) (0.14) (−0.21)
SWF × Foreign 0.0157 0.0031 0.1095 0.0199
(0.53) (0.1) (1.06) (−0.65)
SWF political dummy (SWF political index in 0.0453 −0.1058 0.0283
Model 3) × Foreign (0.81) (−1.07) −0.49
Stake (Control in Model 4) 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0947∗∗∗
(3.28) (3.05) (3.09) −3.12
SWF × Stake (Control in Model 4) −0.0002 0.0001 0.0012 0.0116
(−0.28) (0.14) (1.49) −0.31
SWF Norway × Stake (Control in Model 4) 0.0266∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ NA
(2.8) (2.62) NA
SWF political dummy (SWF political −0.0017∗∗∗ −0.0011∗∗∗ −0.1895∗∗∗
index in M3) × Stake (Control in M4) (−2.98) (−3.15) (−4.29)
Director 0.0187 0.0118 0.0076 0.0119
(0.47) (0.33) (0.22) −0.35
SWF × Director −0.0406 −0.0746∗ −0.092∗ −0.0734∗
(−0.97) (−1.71) (−1.72) (−1.66)
SWF political dummy (SWF political index 0.0378 0.0231 0.0366
in Model 3) × Director (0.93) (0.98) −0.85
SWF × Stake× Director −0.0017∗∗∗
(−2.67)
CHS ∼0.0001 ∼0.0001 ∼0.0001 ∼0.0001
(1.19) (0.97) (0.96) −1.01
SWF× CHS −0.0003 −0.0006∗∗∗ −0.0016∗∗∗ −0.0009∗∗∗
(−1.24) (−3.34) (−4.7) (−4.81)
SWF Norway × CHS 0.0007∗ 0.0017∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗
(1.86) (3.47) −2.52
SWF political dummy (SWF political index 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0018∗∗∗
in Model 3) × CHS (2.9) (3.78) −3.28
Acquirer country democracy 0.0013 0.0021∗ 0.0023∗ 0.0017
(1.03) (1.67) (1.77) −0.12
SWF × Acquirer country democracy −0.0016 −0.0059 −0.0034 −0.0057
(−0.94) (−1.52) (−0.81) (−1.43)
SWF political dummy (SWF political 0.0013 −0.0029 0.0012
index in M3) × Acquirer Country Democracy (0.13) (−0.72) −0.12
Observations, matched 143 143 143 143
Observations, SWFs 391 391 391 391
Adj. R2 89.07% 89.45% 89.62% 89.82%
This table includes coefficient estimates obtained by weighted least-squares optimization with propensity-score-
derived weights, as in Caliendo and Kopening (2008). The response variable is the market-model cumulative
abnormal return over the three-day window surrounding an investments announcement. All predictors are as
described in Table A1 in the Appendix. Industry, target country, and year fixed effects are included, as well as
additional controls as listed in Table 6, but related coefficient estimates are omitted. Models 3 and model 4 are
constructed as in Table 6. Standard *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level.
that, when a SWF appoints a director, for each percentage point increase in
Stake the market reaction declines by 0.1 percentage points. This evidence
points, once more, strongly to an active role of SWFs—the discount, being
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specific to SWFs appointing directors, does not appear to be the result of a
passive role.
In the second model, we once more add the identifiers for Norway and for
political SWFs, and the related interactions. We interact the political SWF
identifier with Directors, but we do not do so for Norway, as the latter SWF
does not acquire seats on boards in any of the observations in our sample. We
once more find that the size of the stake acquired is positively related to the
market reaction if the acquiring SWF is Norwegian, but negatively related to
the size of the stake acquired if the acquiring SWF is classified as political. We
further find that the market reaction is lower when the acquiring SWF appoints
a director; yet, while the coefficient estimate indicates that a SWF acquiring a
seat leads to a drop in abnormal return, the result is only statistically significant
at the 10% level. Finally, we confirm the findings from Table 6 regarding the
relation between SWF types and Closely held shares.
In the third and fourth model we replicate the analysis presented in Table
6, by first replacing the binary identifier for political SWFs with the political
index and then by replacing the Stake variable with the binary Control. For
the sake of brevity, we do not discuss these results in detail, as they largely
confirm our previous findings, although the estimated impact of SWFs acquiring
seats is −9.20% and −7.34%, respectively. Finally, in contrast to the previous
results, the Acquirer country democracy variable has a significantly (10% level)
positive coefficient in two of four specifications for all financial investors,
though never for SWFs specifically. This suggests that investors generally
prefer acquirers from democratic societies over those from authoritarian ones,
though the effect is not different for SWFs rather than private sector investors,
nor does it differ across SWF types.
As before, these results offer support for the political agenda hypothesis, and
refute the predictions of either the passive investor hypothesis or the monitoring
investor hypothesis.
5. Long-Term Operating Performance
Given the low level of transparency of SWFs and the scarce understanding of
this relatively young class of institutional investors by the general public, it is
plausible that the announcement-period market reaction might not accurately
and fully incorporate the valuation effects of SWFs.Accordingly, to test whether
the results we document for the announcement window (the discount associated
with SWF investments) is an accurate reflection of the long-term effect, we
analyze changes in measures of profitability (proxied by Return on assets),
growth (Sales growth), and valuation (Market to book) over one, two, and
three years following the SWF investment. Effective monitoring should lead
to an increase in profitability, growth rates, and valuation metrics; on the other
hand, both the PAH and PIH predict a decline in these variables. We further
note that the presence of a sovereign investor could give the firm preferential
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access to capital from state-owned banks, thus possibly increasing leverage
(measured by the Debt-to-assets ratio) and that a sovereign investor might be
risk adverse and thus cause the firm to decrease leverage or maintain higher
levels of liquidity (measured by the Quick ratio). We benchmark the impact of
SWFs on investment targets to the set of private sector investments identified via
propensity score matching on the basis of both target and deal characteristics.
We present difference-in-differences tests in Section 5.1 and cross-sectional
analysis in Section 5.2.
5.1 Operating performance of SWF investment targets and
private-sector-matched investments
As noted, for each variable of interest, we compute changes over the one, two,
and three years following investment by the SWF. For example, in estimating
the change in Return on assets (ROA) over the year following the SWF
investment (say, for example, an investment that occurs during the year 2010),
we compute the difference between the value of the variable as of the end of
the calendar year following the investment (December 31, 2011) and the end
of the year preceding the SWF investment (December 31, 2009). We proceed
similarly over the two and three-year horizons and for all other variables. As in
previous analyses, to mitigate the impact of outliers, all continuous variables
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of the distribution. We test the
significance of these changes using t-tests with standard errors clustered at the
target firm level. We also compute changes in operating performance variables
for the matched sample identified in Section 4 and Appendix Table A2 based
on both target and deal characteristics. Finally, we compute difference-in-
differences statistics by subtracting changes in the variable of interest for the
matched sample from changes for the SWF sample. We present our findings
in Table 8. The exact sample size used in each test is indicated in the table,
but, in general, the number of available observations shrinks over the longer
time horizons (sample sizes in this table range from 631 to 169). Survivorship
biases raise questions about the interpretation of absolute performance analysis,
yet, as long as survivorship biases affect our SWF and matched samples in a
similar fashion, the analysis of relative performance, which is our main point
of interest, should lead to valid inference.
We find that SWF targets experience a decline in profitability over all
time horizons: Return on assets declines by 2.31 percentage points over one
year, 1.13 over two, and 1.76 over three. In contrast, we find no statistically
significant change in Return on assets for the matched sample. The difference-
in-differences is statistically significant for the two-year (at the 1% level) and
three-year (at the 10% level) horizons. Kotter and Lel (2011) likewise observe
a decline in Return on assets for SWF targets, yet they find a similar decline
in in a sample of firms matched by country, industry, and profitability—which
again emphasizes how proper benchmarking affects the inference from these
tests.
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Table 8
Difference-in-differences analysis of long-term performance changes after investment
Variable
(mean change relative to the Year SWFs (1) Matched sample (2) Difference- Obs
year prior to the investment) in-differences (1)-(2)
Return on assets 1 −2.31%∗∗∗ −0.63% −1.68% 517
(−3.7) (−0.7) (−1.47)
2 −1.13%∗∗ 5.88%∗∗∗ −7.01%∗∗∗ 445
(−1.97) (5.4) (−5.59)
3 −1.76%∗∗ 0.87% −2.63%∗ 266
(−2.4) (0.62) (−1.69)
Sales growth 1 −8.63%∗∗∗ −0.28% −8.35%∗∗∗ 284
(−3.82) (−0.25) (−3.19)
2 −12.17%∗∗∗ −11.32%∗∗∗ −0.85% 360
(−5.84) (−7.15) (−0.33)
3 −8.89%∗∗∗ 3.42%∗∗ −12.30%∗∗∗ 189
(−3.76) (2.27) (−4.49)
Market to book 1 −1.60∗∗∗ 0.04 −1.63∗∗∗ 496
(−6.63) (0.22) (−5.59)
2 −1.32∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗ −1.01∗∗∗ 430
(−4.98) (−2.1) (−3.37)
3 −1.33∗∗∗ −0.72∗∗∗ −0.61 261
(−3.4) (−3.34) (−1.36)
Quick ratio 1 0.25∗∗ 0.35∗∗ −0.10 350
(2.03) (2.48) (−0.52)
2 0.14∗ 0.37∗∗ −0.23 305
(1.66) (2.34) (−1.3)
3 0.06 −0.07 0.13 169
(0.57) (−0.53) (0.75)
Debt to assets 1 −0.22% 5.29%∗∗∗ −5.51%∗∗∗ 631
(−0.34) (7.47) (−6.23)
2 −0.72% 4.98%∗∗∗ −5.71%∗∗∗ 490
(−1.07) (6.62) (−5.99)
3 −0.94% 1.81%∗∗ −2.75%∗∗ 426
(−1.13) (2.16) (−2.31)
This table presents mean changes (differences) in Return on assets, Sales growth, Market to book, Quick ratio,
and Debt to assets (as defined in Table A1 in the Appendix) for both the sample of SWF investments and for
the sample of matched private sector investments (using the matching algorithm based on both target and deal
characteristics derived from model 2 presented in TableA2 in theAppendix). Variables are measured as of Dec. 31
of each year. The base value is as of Dec. 31 of the year preceding the investment. The difference reported for year
1 is the difference between the value as of Dec. 31 of the year following the investment and Dec. 31 of the year
preceding the investment and values for years 2 and 3 are similarly computed. Mean difference-in-differences
values are computed as the difference between the mean change for the SWF sample and the mean change for
the matched sample. The statistical significance of mean differences is tested with t-tests with standard errors
clustered at the target level; t-statistics are reported below the means. Obs. reports the number of observations
used in computing the mean difference-in-differences. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and
0.01 level.
Similarly, we find a statistically significant decline in Sales growth for
SWF investment targets over all time horizons and the effect is economically
important: a decline of 8.89 percentage points over three years. Difference-in-
differences tests are significant over the one- and three-year windows. Finally,
we find the Market-to-book ratio showing a statistically significant decline over
all time horizons. However, we also observe a decline in Market to book for
the matched sample over the two- and three-year horizon. The difference-in-
differences is negative and statistically significant overt the one- and two-year
horizons, but not over the three-year horizon.
The decline in profitability, growth rates, and valuations relative to the
matched sample is consistent with the political agenda hypothesis and the
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passive investor hypothesis, but not with the monitoring investor hypothesis.
We further find evidence of increased liquidity for both SWF targets and for
the matched sample, but the results are statistically and economically weak
and difference-in-differences tests are not significant. Finally, while we find a
slight decline, economically tiny and statistically not significant, in leverage (as
measured by Debt to assets) for the SWF sample, the matched sample displays
a significant increase. The difference-in-differences is negative and statistically
significant at all three time horizons, indicating a decline in leverage for SWF
investment targets relative to private-sector targets.
Given the skewed distribution of operating performance variables, we
replicate, but do not report in detail, the same analysis by focusing on sample
medians rather than means. The inference we draw is virtually identical,
pointing to deteriorating performance of SWF investment targets, no changes
in liquidity, and lower leverage.
5.2 Cross-sectional analysis of operating performance
While the difference-in-differences analysis provides robust evidence of
deterioration in the performance of SWF investment targets, strongly
suggesting that SWFs do not play a value-enhancing monitoring role in their
investment targets, it does not allow us to discriminate between the political
agenda and the passive investor hypotheses, as both predict deteriorating
profitability, growth, and valuation. Accordingly, we examine the determinants
of this decline using regression analysis. We fit the same model described in
Section 4, but using as response variables Returns on assets, Sales growth, and
the Market-to-book ratio as of the end of the third year following the SWF
investment. The respective values as of the year prior to the investment are
included as controls. As before, we estimate coefficients using weighted least
squares based on propensity scores and include only matched observations,
to minimize the impact of SWF selection. Standard errors are clustered at the
target and year level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. As before, we also
include country, year, and industry fixed effects in all models.
In estimating the impact on Return on assets, we find that the coefficient
estimate associated with the interaction between the political SWF identifier
and the stake acquired is negative and statistically significant (at the 10% level).
For every percentage point stake acquired by a political SWF, Return on assets
declines by 0.1 percentage points, which is consistent with the PAH. On the
other side, all other coefficient estimates related to the impact of SWFs are not
statistically significant.
In estimating the impact on Sales growth, we find that the binary variable
identifying SWF investors has a negative and significant (at the 5% level)
coefficient, indicating that, over three years, Sales growth of SWF targets
declines by a dramatic 25 percentage points. Even more, the interaction between
the political SWF identifier and the stake acquired is negative and statistically
significant (at the 5% level). For every percentage point stake acquired by
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a political SWF, Sales growth declines by 0.34 percentage points, which is
consistent with the PAH. The other explanatory variables interacted with the
SWF binary identifier are not statistically significant. Finally, our regression
analysis analyzing changes in the Market-to-book ratio leads to no statistically
significant coefficient estimates for the variables of interest.
Overall, the cross-sectional regression analysis of operating performance
offers only limited evidence, since the explanatory power of the models appears
weak, perhaps due to the high level of noise and the general difficulty of
modeling changes in operating performance. Nevertheless, the statistically
significant results that we do document point to deterioration in Return on assets
and Sales growth being related to the size of the stake acquired by “political”
SWFs: the larger the stake acquired by a fund subject to political interference,
the lower future profitability and growth. These results point in the direction of
the political agenda hypothesis, rather than the passive investor hypothesis.
In unreported additional tests, we re-estimate the same models using quantile
regressions, effectively estimating the conditional medians (rather than means,
as in the weighted-least-squares regressions presented above). The results
remain robust, indicating that the stake acquired by political SWFs is related
to lower Return on assets and Sales growth.
6. Explaining the Positive Market Reaction at Announcement
Our main interest lies in the relative performance of SWF investment targets
as compared to similar targets of investments by private-sector financial
firms. However, we cannot ignore the fact that the positive market reaction
at announcement of SWF investments is not consistent with subsequent
deterioration in operating performance.26 One possible explanation of this
apparently irrational market reaction is that the impact of SWFs is not well
understood due to their novel and opaque nature. In this case, we would expect
this positive market reaction to weaken, or disappear, over time, as more studies
of SWF impact have emerged. In unreported analysis, we split the sample into
two sub-periods, based on announcement date of the investment, but find no
evidence of a weaker market reaction in recent years. We further note that this
positive market reaction, without subsequent improvement in the long term, is
not specific to SWFs. While private-sector investments in our sample display
a positive market reaction, but no subsequent long term performance improve-
ment, in the SWF sample a positive market reaction is followed by deterioration
in operating performance. Nevertheless, this inconsistency is not a feature of
SWF investments, but has been documented by the above literature on takeover
expectations, as well as by studies of equity offerings (for example, Hertzel et al.
2002). Overall, the patterns we observe are most consistent with Mikkelson
26 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this line of inquiry.
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and Ruback (1985), who find that the positive return for target firms around
corporate investments is due to the expectation of a takeover that often follows
corporate block investments. Their findings have been echoed in a stream of
other papers, most recently by Greenwood and Schoar (2009). This “takeover
expectation” hypothesis reconciles the observed positive market reaction with
the lack of a subsequent operating performance improvement that we observe
in all (SWF and benchmark private-sector) investments in our sample, as the
market reaction is due to the expectation of a takeover premium payment, rather
than to anticipated improvements in firm operational performance.
To further test this hypothesis, in unreported analysis, we split the SWF
sample into two subsets, respectively encompassing investments in stakes
greater than (or equal to) 5%, or less than 5%. Consistently with the literature on
takeover expectations, we find that both SWF investments and private-sector
investments elicit a positive market reaction when the size of the stake acquired
is greater than (or equal to) 5%. The market reaction to SWF investments is
2.62%, while the market reaction to private-sector investments matched by
both target and deal characteristics is 4.14%. The estimated “SWF discount”
is 1.52%, which is greater, in magnitude, than the discount associated with
the overall sample, but the result is not statistically significant, perhaps due
to the smaller sample size. On the other hand, for the sample of acquisitions
of stakes below 5%, we observe a negative market reaction associated with
SWF investments (−0.55%) and a positive, but much smaller, market reaction
to private-sector investments (0.60%). The SWF discount in this sample is
−1.15% and is significant at the 1% level.
Accordingly, our interpretation of the results is that all investments (private
sector or SWF originated) lead to a positive market reaction when the size of
the stake is large enough to indicate a likely future takeover. Yet, aside from
this common effect to all investments, SWFs have other, incremental, effects
on firm value. Based on our analysis, what differentiates SWF from private
sector investments is the risk of political interference, which results in a
relatively lower market reaction at announcement and operating performance
over the longer term.
7. Conclusions
Sovereign wealth funds are key actors in the global financial landscape. Yet,
given their high level of heterogeneity and general lack of transparency, extant
research has provided an incomplete view of their impact. Host governments
have argued that SWFs are managed independently to invest in a diverse set
of asset classes in pursuit of commercial returns. Being supposedly controlled
at arms’ length by their sponsoring governments, SWFs should operate as any
other financial investor and no differences should emerge between the financial
performance of targets acquired by SWFs and by private institutional investors.
This study questions that view and finds that the sovereign nature of the
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Table 9
Regression analysis of long-term operating performance
Return on assets Sales growth Market to book
Variable (Year 3) (Year 3) (Year 3)
Intercept −104.76 85.56 32.34
(−0.58) (0.27) (0.75)
SWF −5.32 −25.63∗∗ 1.89
(−0.98) (−2.03) (0.99)
SWF Norway 6.37 −12.55 7.29
(0.61) (−0.42) (1.6)
SWF political index 52.51 72.89 −6.77
(1.23) (0.67) (−0.63)
Foreign 2.45 2.01 0.48
(0.62) (0.23) (0.54)
SWF × Foreign 3.63 12.14 −3.18
(0.71) (0.94) (−1.56)
SWF political dummy × Foreign −40.05 −30.10 9.36
(−1.03) (−0.29) (0.86)
Stake −0.06 −0.39 −0.01
(−0.33) (−1.01) (−0.38)
SWF × Stake 0.10 0.44 −0.03
(0.58) (1.02) (−0.88)
SWF Norway × Stake −3.47 −1.86 0.30
(−1.47) (−1.01) (0.71)
SWF political dummy × Stake −0.11∗ −0.34∗∗ 0.01
(−1.69) (−2.11) (0.17)
Director −0.31 0.71 −0.67
(−0.07) (0.05) (−0.56)
SWF × Director −0.26 −6.01 −0.60
(−0.06) (−0.41) (−0.36)
SWF political dummy × Director 9.55 −10.17 3.28
(1.48) (−0.44) (1.37)
CHS 0.00 −0.01 ∼−0.01∗∗
(−0.55) (−0.81) (−2.25)
SWF× CHS 0.09 −0.23 0.04
(1.54) (−1.51) (0.96)
SWF Norway × CHS −0.10 0.04 −0.06
(−1.34) (0.22) (−1.21)
SWF political dummy× CHS −0.13 0.08 −0.03
(−1.31) (0.3) (−0.68)
Acquirer country democracy 0.30 −0.73 0.06
(1.08) (−1.14) (0.91)
SWF × Acquirer country democracy 0.47 1.12 −0.46
(0.6) (0.46) (−1.42)
SWF political dummy× Acquirer country democracy 0.36 4.57 0.56
(0.2) (0.66) (0.98)
Observations, matched sample 89 87 88
Observations, SWFs 321 321 321
Adj. R2 35.31% 44.35% 22.47%
This table includes coefficient estimates obtained by weighted least-squares optimization with propensity-score-
derived weights, as in Caliendo and Kopening (2008). The response variables are Return on assets (first column),
Sales growth (second column), and Market to book (third column), all as of December 31 of the third year
following the related investment. All predictors are as described in Table A1 in the Appendix. Industry, target
country, and year fixed effects are included, as well as additional controls for deal characteristics (First investment
and Capital injection), time-varying firm characteristics (log of Total assets, Debt to assets, Sales growth, Quick
ratio, and Buy-and-Hold abnormal return over the previous year) and target country metrics (GDP Growth, log
of GDP per capita, Market cap to GDP, Target country democracy, Target country common, and Crisis), but
related coefficient estimates are omitted. Standard errors are robust and clustered by investment target and year;
t-statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and
0.01 level.
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investing SWFs negatively affects target firm value and operating performance,
relative to private-sector investors.
While markets react positively to the news of any investment by a financial
investor, the purchaser being a SWF leads to a weaker (albeit, on average, still
positive) reaction indicative of a “SWF discount.” Further, SWF investments
lead to deteriorating long-term operating performance, both in absolute terms
and relative to private-sector investments. These results are robust to controls
for target selection preferences by SWFs and for a large set of control factors
at the country, year, industry, firm, and deal level.
Market reactions are affected by behavioral and structural characteristics of
the funds. Particularly, the extent of activism by the SWF plays an important
role, as larger discounts are associated with the presence of the SWF on the
board of directors of the target company in combination with larger stakes
acquired. Our results thus provide support to the view that a higher profile
in the corporate governance of the investee company by the SWF destroys
firm value. However, we also show that the governance structure of the SWFs
matters, in that larger discounts and deteriorating performance are associated
with large investments by highly politicized SWFs, such as those under strict
government oversight. Consistently, investments by Norway’s GPFG are not
associated with a discount, as it is widely seen as a more sophisticated and
nonthreatening investor than many of its peers.
A few caveats are in order. First, our research offers insights into the impact
of SWFs on the value and performance of the publicly traded firms in which
they invest. There are reasons to believe that, lacking the transparency and
market oversight of public firms, political influences and pressure would be
even stronger on privately held (unlisted) entities. While it would be desirable
to investigate the impact on private firms, data limitations prevent us from doing
so, yet we note this would be an interesting topic for future research. Second,
we note that the underperformance of investment targets does not provide
conclusive evidence regarding the performance of SWF investment portfolios.
While we have anecdotal evidence, and incomplete data, backing the assertion
that SWFs are long-term investors, we have no comprehensive dataset on
divestments. Further, the exact price per share paid at the time of investment is
often withheld from the public; while using the contemporaneous market price
is an acceptable approximation in gauging the impact on the firm, it is not usable
in evaluating the return on investment earned by SWFs. Lacking a clear divest-
ment date and exact transaction value, it is impossible to precisely estimate
returns on SWF portfolios. Finally, we caution against applying our findings of
a political-interference discount too broadly. We stress that SWFs are a hetero-
geneous group: while some have failed to develop the internal governance struc-
tures necessary to insulate management from political interference, others have
succeeded.Anecdotal evidence indicates that the successful institutional design
exemplified by Norway’s GPFG is already being cited as a model to emulate
by a number of countries which are considering starting their own SWFs.
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Table A2
Probability of SWF as an acquirer determined from probit models
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Intercept −7.5492∗∗∗ −7.8694∗∗∗
(58.8933) (49.4011)
Foreign −1.557∗∗∗ −1.3965∗∗∗
(144.846) (83.1869)
Total assets (log) 0.393∗∗∗ 0.3856∗∗∗
(127.1267) (99.1662)
Return on assets 0.0047 0.0204∗∗∗
(0.5722) (6.6507)
Debt to assets −0.0015 −0.0033
(0.1598) (0.6352)
Market to book 0.0257 0.0139
(1.7386) (0.4464)
Closely held shares 0.0001 −0.0001
(0.0522) (0.0876)
Buy and hold abnormal return, market adjusted, previous year 0.2286∗∗∗ 0.2126∗∗
(9.6571) (6.0246)
Target country GDP per capita (log) −0.0156 −0.0120
(0.0469) (0.0199)
Target country GDP growth 0.0290 0.0388
(1.0593) (1.3782)
Market capitalization to GDP −0.0011 −0.0007
(0.7267) (0.1701)
Target country common 0.7603∗∗∗ 0.8504∗∗∗
(19.3717) (15.405)
Target country democracy −0.0186 −0.031∗∗
(2.0509) (4.0016)
Crisis 1.2471∗∗∗ 1.4628∗∗∗
(64.971) (57.2322)
Capital injection 0.4685∗∗
(4.7678)
Control 1.1155∗∗
(5.0576)
Stake −0.0248∗∗∗
(9.777)
First investment 0.5041∗∗∗
(19.1403)
Observations 3,807 2,886
Percent concordant 97.6% 98.4%
Percent discordant 2.2% 1.5%
This table includes coefficient estimates from probit models. The response is a binary variable assuming the
value of one if the investor is a SWF or a SWF-majority-owned subsidiary and zero otherwise. All predictors
are as defined in Table A1. Industry and year controls are included, but related coefficient estimates are omitted.
Standard errors are clustered at the investment target level; Wald’s chi-square test statistics are reported in
parentheses below the related coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and
0.01 level.
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